Post-Quantum Cryptography in IPsec: IKEv2, Standards and Migration


Contents
  1. 1. IKEv2 in a nutshell
    1. 1.1 The exchanges
    2. 1.2 Where the quantum computer hits
    3. 1.3 Extensions that make PQC possible in IKEv2
    4. 1.4 Why RFC 9395 (IKEv1 deprecation) matters for PQC
  2. 2. IANA: the IKEv2 registries
    1. 2.1 Transforms, transform types and transform IDs
    2. 2.2 PQC-relevant registry entries
    3. 2.3 Authentication method 14: how it was done before
    4. 2.4 The PPK notifications
  3. 3. Why IKEv2 needs extensions for pure PQ, PQ/T and PQ/PQ
    1. 3.1 Assumption 1: exactly one key exchange per SA
    2. 3.2 Assumption 2: IKE_SA_INIT messages are small
    3. 3.3 Assumption 3: the key exchange is Diffie-Hellman
    4. 3.4 Assumption 4: one signature algorithm per authentication method
    5. 3.5 Assumption 5: one AUTH payload per peer
    6. 3.6 What each mode needs
  4. 4. The ipsecme work
  5. 5. Algorithm overview
  6. 6. Key exchange and signature sizes in IKEv2
  7. 7. CNSA 2.0 and IPsec
  8. 8. Designing for several regimes
  9. 9. A practical migration path
  10. 10. Sources

This is part 2 of a two-part series. Part 1, Post-Quantum Cryptography: Threat, Standards and Timelines, explains why PQC is urgent, who sets the rules, the hybrid concepts and the algorithms. This part applies that to IKEv2 and IPsec.

1. IKEv2 in a nutshell

1.1 The exchanges

IPsec protects IP packets with ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload). The keys come from IKEv2, specified in RFC 7296 (October 2014). RFC 7296 is one of the few IETF Internet Standards (STD 79).

IKEv2 exchanges

Each exchange is a request and a response. Hover over or tab to a message to see its payloads. Blue arrows (→) are requests, orange arrows (←) are responses. Dashed = optional IKE_INTERMEDIATE (RFC 9242), where large PQ key exchanges go.

InitiatorResponder
  1. IKE_SA_INIT
    IKE_SA_INIT request HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni [, N(...)]
  2. IKE_SA_INIT response HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr [, CERTREQ]
  3. IKE_INTERMEDIATE
    IKE_INTERMEDIATE request (optional) HDR, SK{KEi(n)}
  4. IKE_INTERMEDIATE response (optional) HDR, SK{KEr(n)}
  5. IKE_AUTH
    IKE_AUTH request HDR, SK{IDi, [CERT,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr}
  6. IKE_AUTH response HDR, SK{IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
  7. CREATE_CHILD_SA
    CREATE_CHILD_SA request HDR, SK{SA, Ni, [KEi,] [TSi, TSr]}
  8. CREATE_CHILD_SA response HDR, SK{SA, Nr, [KEr,] [TSi, TSr]}
  9. INFORMATIONAL
    INFORMATIONAL request HDR, SK{[N,] [D,] [CP,] …}
  10. INFORMATIONAL response HDR, SK{[N,] [D,] [CP,] …}
  • IKE_SA_INIT negotiates the cryptographic suite (encryption, PRF, integrity, key exchange method; see transforms) and performs the key exchange in the KE payloads. From the shared secret and the nonces, both sides derive SKEYSEED. From that come the keys SK_d (for deriving Child SA keys), SK_ai/ar (integrity), SK_ei/er (encryption) and SK_pi/pr (used in the AUTH computation). This exchange is not encrypted.
  • IKE_INTERMEDIATE (optional, RFC 9242) sits between IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH and is already encrypted. It is where additional, large PQ key exchanges go.
  • IKE_AUTH is encrypted with those keys. Each peer proves its identity in the AUTH payload, with a signature or a pre-shared key, and the first ESP Child SA is set up.
  • CREATE_CHILD_SA creates more Child SAs and rekeys existing ones. INFORMATIONAL carries notifications, deletes and liveness checks.

1.2 Where the quantum computer hits

Phase / exchangeComponentQuantum impactUrgency
IKE_SA_INIT, CREATE_CHILD_SA (rekey with PFS)KE (DH/ECDH)Broken by Shor; enables decryption of recorded traffic (HNDL)High (HNDL)
IKE_AUTHAUTH (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA signatures) and certificatesBroken by Shor; enables active impersonation once a CRQC existsMedium, rising
All exchanges and ESPPRF, integrity, encryption (HMAC, AES)Only Grover; fine with adequate key sizesLow

1.3 Extensions that make PQC possible in IKEv2

Each of these RFCs fixes a specific limitation of the original protocol. Section 3 explains them in detail:

  • RFC 7383: IKEv2 message fragmentation. It only works on encrypted messages, so not on IKE_SA_INIT. See 3.2.
  • RFC 9242: the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, encrypted and therefore fragmentable; the place for large PQ public keys. See 3.2.
  • RFC 9370: multiple key exchanges, up to seven additional ones (ADDKE1–7), each mixed into the keying material. See 3.1.
  • RFC 7427: generic Digital Signature authentication (method 14). See 3.4 and 2.3.
  • RFC 9593: announcing supported authentication methods (SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS) before IKE_AUTH. See 3.4.

1.4 Why RFC 9395 (IKEv1 deprecation) matters for PQC

RFC 9395 (April 2023) deprecated IKEv1 and moved RFCs 2407, 2408 and 2409 to Historic, together with a set of obsolete algorithms. That matters for PQC in three ways:

  • Every PQC mechanism is IKEv2-only. IKE_INTERMEDIATE, multiple key exchanges, ML-KEM code points, PQ signature authentication and PPK mixing are all defined for IKEv2. IKEv1 has no standardised way to carry an additional key exchange.
  • No new work for IKEv1. Historic status means the IETF will not add new algorithms or extensions to IKEv1. An IKEv1 tunnel therefore cannot become quantum-resistant through standards.
  • It is a good inventory trigger. The same document deprecates old algorithms (DES variants, MD5- and SHA-1-based integrity, among others). Systems that still use them usually also lack the firmware headroom for PQC.

If you still run IKEv1, migrating to IKEv2 is step zero of your PQC migration.


2. IANA: the IKEv2 registries

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) keeps the protocol registries (for the other standards bodies, see part 1). An IETF document defines what an algorithm does in a protocol; IANA assigns the number that goes on the wire. For IKEv2 everything lives in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters registry. Most of its sub-registries use Expert Review (current experts: Tero Kivinen and Valery Smyslov). The registry was last updated on 13 November 2026.

2.1 Transforms, transform types and transform IDs

In IKE_SA_INIT the initiator offers one or more proposals in the SA payload. Each proposal is a list of transforms. Every transform has two numbers:

  • a Transform Type, saying what role the algorithm plays: 1 = encryption (ENCR), 2 = pseudo-random function (PRF), 3 = integrity (INTEG), 4 = key exchange method (KE), 5 = sequence numbers, and since RFC 9370, 6–12 = additional key exchanges 1–7 (ADDKE1–ADDKE7);
  • a Transform ID, saying which algorithm within that role. The numbering is separate per type.

“Transform Type 4, ID 36” therefore means “key exchange method: ML-KEM-768”. The same number 36 under another transform type means something else entirely. Transform Type 4 IDs used to be called Diffie-Hellman group numbers, and that is why many configuration guides still talk about “DH group 19” or “DH group 31”. A PQ/T hybrid proposal could look like this:

Proposal 1:
  Type 1 (ENCR)    ID 20  ENCR_AES_GCM_16, 256-bit key
  Type 2 (PRF)     ID 6   PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384
  Type 4 (KE)      ID 20  384-bit random ECP group (P-384)
  Type 6 (ADDKE1)  ID 37  ml-kem-1024

The responder picks one transform per type. Here that results in ECDH P-384 in IKE_SA_INIT, followed by ML-KEM-1024 in an IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange.

2.2 PQC-relevant registry entries

RegistryEntryDefined by
Transform TypesType 4 renamed from “Diffie-Hellman Group” to Key Exchange Method (KE)RFC 9370
Transform TypesTypes 6–12: Additional Key Exchange 1–7 (ADDKE1…ADDKE7)RFC 9370
Transform Type 4 IDs (also valid for types 6–12)35 ml-kem-512, 36 ml-kem-768, 37 ml-kem-1024draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem
Authentication Method14 Digital Signature (generic, see below)RFC 7427
Hash Algorithms (SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS)5 Identity (needed for ML-DSA/SLH-DSA, which hash internally)RFC 8420
Notify typesUSE_PPK (16435), PPK_IDENTITY (16436), NO_PPK_AUTH (16437)RFC 8784
Notify typesUSE_PPK_INT (16445), PPK_IDENTITY_KEY (16446)RFC 9867
Transform registries“Status” column marking deprecated algorithmsRFC 9395

2.3 Authentication method 14: how it was done before

In the AUTH payload, the Auth Method field tells the receiver how to verify the authentication data. Originally, each method number fixed the complete algorithm, including the hash:

ValueMethodDefined inWhat was fixed
1RSA Digital SignatureRFC 7296RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5; the hash was not negotiated
2Shared Key Message Integrity CodeRFC 7296PSK-based MAC with the negotiated PRF
3DSS Digital SignatureRFC 7296DSA with SHA-1
9 / 10 / 11ECDSA with SHA-256 on P-256 / SHA-384 on P-384 / SHA-512 on P-521RFC 4754curve and hash per number
14Digital SignatureRFC 7427nothing: the algorithm is named inside the AUTH data

This model did not scale. Every new combination of signature scheme, parameters and hash, such as RSA-PSS or Ed25519, needed a new method number and a new RFC. RFC 7427 (2015) solved this with the generic method 14. The AUTH data starts with an ASN.1 AlgorithmIdentifier, the same object identifiers (OIDs) used in X.509 certificates, followed by the signature. The hash function is negotiated separately with the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification.

For PQC this is very convenient. ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and composite ML-DSA need no new IKEv2 code points: they reuse the OIDs from RFC 9881, RFC 9909 and RFC 10073. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth makes no IANA requests at all. The only addition is the “Identity” hash (5), because ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign the whole message themselves instead of a pre-computed hash (section 3.4).

2.4 The PPK notifications

Post-quantum preshared keys (PPKs) are negotiated with five Notify payloads:

Notify (value)RFCSent inPurpose
USE_PPK (16435)RFC 8784IKE_SA_INIT, both directions“I support PPKs and want to use one.” No data.
PPK_IDENTITY (16436)RFC 8784IKE_AUTH (request); reused by RFC 9867 in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE responseIdentifies which PPK is used (the PPK_ID). In RFC 9867 the responder uses it to confirm the PPK it selected.
NO_PPK_AUTH (16437)RFC 8784IKE_AUTH requestContains an alternative AUTH value computed without the PPK, so that a responder without that PPK can still authenticate the initiator when PPK use is optional
USE_PPK_INT (16445)RFC 9867IKE_SA_INIT, both directions, together with INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTEDNegotiates the RFC 9867 variant, where the PPK is mixed in during IKE_INTERMEDIATE so that the initial IKE SA is protected too
PPK_IDENTITY_KEY (16446)RFC 9867Last IKE_INTERMEDIATE requestOne or more candidate PPKs, each as a PPK_ID plus an 8-byte PPK Confirmation (first 8 bytes of prf(PPK, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)). The responder can check that it has the same PPK without the key being revealed.

A responder chooses one mechanism: RFC 8784 (USE_PPK) or RFC 9867 (USE_PPK_INT), never both.


3. Why IKEv2 needs extensions for pure PQ, PQ/T and PQ/PQ

IKEv2 as specified in RFC 7296 was designed around Diffie-Hellman and classical signatures. Several of its assumptions break as soon as post-quantum algorithms enter the picture. This section explains which assumptions break and which extension fixes each one.

3.1 Assumption 1: exactly one key exchange per SA

In RFC 7296, the SA proposal carries a single Transform Type 4 (D-H group), and IKE_SA_INIT carries a single KE payload. There is no way to negotiate or perform two key exchanges. Every hybrid needs at least two, so this is the first blocker.

Fix: RFC 9370 (Multiple Key Exchanges). It renames Transform Type 4 to Key Exchange Method and adds Transform Types 6–12, Additional Key Exchange 1–7 (example proposal). These carry up to seven extra key exchanges, run one by one in IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges (during initial setup) or in IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges (when creating or rekeying SAs). After each additional exchange, the new shared secret is chained into the keying material: SKEYSEED(n) = prf(SK_d(n-1), SK(n) | Ni | Nr). The final keys therefore depend on all shared secrets, which is exactly the “secure if one component holds” property a hybrid needs.

An ADDKE transform may include the value NONE, which makes that extra exchange optional. That is useful for interoperability, but it opens a downgrade path. A policy that requires PQ must therefore not offer NONE.

3.2 Assumption 2: IKE_SA_INIT messages are small

IKE_SA_INIT is sent before any keys exist, so it is neither encrypted nor integrity-protected. IKEv2 fragmentation (RFC 7383) only works inside the encrypted SK payload, which means IKE_SA_INIT cannot be fragmented by IKE. Traditional KE payloads are small: 32 bytes for X25519, 96 for P-384, 384 for MODP-3072. With nonces, the SA proposal, NAT detection and possibly a cookie, IKE_SA_INIT fits comfortably in one packet.

ML-KEM-768 adds about 1.2 KB on the initiator side, ML-KEM-1024 about 1.6 KB, and FrodoKEM roughly ten times as much (sizes in section 6). The result exceeds the 1,280-byte IPv6 minimum MTU and often the typical 1,500-byte Ethernet path. IP fragmentation of UDP is then the only option, and fragments are frequently dropped by firewalls, NAT devices and carrier networks. Fragments are also a known denial-of-service vector.

Fix: RFC 9242 (IKE_INTERMEDIATE). This new exchange sits between IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH. It is already protected with keys derived from IKE_SA_INIT, so it can be fragmented with RFC 7383. Large PQ public keys and ciphertexts go there instead of into IKE_SA_INIT. RFC 9242 also adds the IKE_INTERMEDIATE content to the data signed in IKE_AUTH, so the intermediate exchanges are authenticated afterwards.

The alternative is a transport without this limit: TCP encapsulation (RFC 9329), or the separate IKE and ESP transports in draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport.

3.3 Assumption 3: the key exchange is Diffie-Hellman

With Diffie-Hellman, both peers send a public value of the same kind, and either side could send first. A KEM is asymmetric:

  1. The initiator generates a key pair and sends the encapsulation key.
  2. The responder runs Encaps and sends back a ciphertext.
  3. The initiator runs Decaps. Both now share the same 32-byte secret.

Luckily, this maps onto the IKEv2 request/response flow, because the initiator always speaks first. It still needs its own specification: what goes into the KE payload on each side, which validity checks must be done (FIPS 203 encapsulation key check and ciphertext type check), and the rule that key pairs must never be reused. Some DH implementations reuse ephemeral keys for performance; for ML-KEM that is forbidden. This is what draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem defines, together with the IANA code points 35–37. Every additional KEM, such as FrodoKEM or HQC, needs a similar document and code points of its own.

3.4 Assumption 4: one signature algorithm per authentication method

RFC 7296 ties authentication methods to specific algorithms (RSA = 1, DSS = 3), and RFC 4754 added ECDSA variants (9–11) with a fixed hash per curve (history). Adding a new method number for every PQ parameter set does not scale.

Fix: RFC 7427 (Digital Signature, method 14) identifies the algorithm with an X.509 AlgorithmIdentifier, so the OIDs from RFC 9881 (ML-DSA), RFC 9909 (SLH-DSA) and RFC 10073 (composite) can be reused. RFC 7427 assumes hash-then-sign, with the hash negotiated in SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA instead process the whole message internally, so peers must announce the “Identity” hash (RFC 8420). RFC 9593 (SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS) lets peers tell each other which signature algorithms they accept before IKE_AUTH. All of this is specified in draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth.

PQ signatures plus certificate chains add several kilobytes to IKE_AUTH. IKE_AUTH is encrypted, so RFC 7383 fragmentation can carry them, and the draft makes fragmentation support mandatory.

3.5 Assumption 5: one AUTH payload per peer

A peer authenticates with one AUTH payload. A composite signature (RFC 10073) is one algorithm, one key and one signature, so it fits without protocol changes; draft-ietf-ipsecme-pq-hybrid-auth profiles it. Parallel hybrid authentication with two independent certificates and signatures does not fit and needs protocol changes. That is the subject of individual drafts such as draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth-with-sep-cert and draft-wang-ipsecme-multi-auth-ikev2-pq.

3.6 What each mode needs

ModeTypical IKEv2 setupExtensions requiredRemaining constraints
Pure PQML-KEM as the only KE in IKE_SA_INIT; ML-DSA or SLH-DSA authenticationML-KEM KE draft (KEM semantics, code points); PQC-auth draft + RFC 7427 + RFC 8420 + RFC 7383Only ML-KEM-512 fits IKE_SA_INIT safely over UDP. ML-KEM-768/1024 need a known large PMTU or a reliable transport (RFC 9329). No fallback if ML-KEM is ever broken. This is why CNSA 2.0 does not simply put ML-KEM-1024 in IKE_SA_INIT.
PQ/T hybrid(EC)DH in IKE_SA_INIT + ML-KEM as ADDKE1 in IKE_INTERMEDIATE; composite or PQ authenticationRFC 9370 + RFC 9242 + RFC 7383 + ML-KEM KE draft; for authentication, RFC 10073 + the hybrid-auth draftOne extra round trip. Policy must omit NONE in ADDKE1 to prevent downgrade.
PQ/PQ hybridTwo PQ KEMs from different families, e.g. ML-KEM + FrodoKEM (or HQC)Everything above + a KE specification and IANA code points for the second KEM (FrodoKEM: WG draft; HQC: individual draft; no code points yet)IKE_SA_INIT still needs a KE: a traditional group (giving a triple hybrid), ML-KEM-512, or a reliable transport. FrodoKEM’s size makes fragmentation unavoidable. Each extra KEM adds a round trip.

For most deployments PQ/T hybrid is the sensible default: it protects against a quantum computer and against a flaw in the young PQ algorithm, as long as not both happen at once (scenario table in part 1). PQ-only removes that safety net.

Two newer ideas aim to reduce the cost of all this. A composite key exchange carries a PQ and a traditional KEM in one exchange over a reliable transport (draft-reddy-ipsecme-ikev2-hybrid-reliable, individual). Downgrade prevention is being made generic in draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention, which is in the RFC Editor queue.


4. The ipsecme work

The IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (ipsecme) working group maintains IKEv2 and ESP and specifies how PQC is used in them. Certificates (lamps) and general PQC guidance (pquip) are covered in part 1.

DocumentSubjectStatus (Nov 2026)
RFC 8784Mixing PPKs into IKEv2Proposed Standard (Jun 2020)
RFC 9242IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchangeProposed Standard (May 2022)
RFC 9370Multiple key exchanges in IKEv2Proposed Standard (May 2023)
RFC 9395Deprecation of IKEv1 and obsolete algorithmsProposed Standard (Apr 2023)
RFC 9867PPKs in IKE_INTERMEDIATE and CREATE_CHILD_SAProposed Standard (Nov 2025)
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-09ML-KEM key exchange in IKEv2 (alone or as additional exchange)RFC Editor queue, intended Proposed Standard; code points 35–37 assigned
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-12ML-DSA and SLH-DSA authentication in IKEv2RFC Editor queue, intended Proposed Standard
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention-08Protection against downgrade attacksRFC Editor queue
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport-08Separate transports for IKE and ESPSubmitted to IESG
draft-ietf-ipsecme-pq-hybrid-auth-01Composite signatures (RFC 10073) in IKEv2WG document
draft-ietf-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03FrodoKEM key exchange in IKEv2WG document
draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-profile-05CNSA 2.0 profile for IPsec (would obsolete RFC 9206)Individual, intended Informational

Key details of the two most important drafts:

  • ML-KEM (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-09): the KE payload carries the ML-KEM encapsulation key (initiator) or ciphertext (responder). A fresh key pair is required for every exchange, and keys must not be reused. Recipients must perform the input checks from FIPS 203 (encapsulation key check, ciphertext type check). The 32-byte shared secret is used just like the (EC)DH shared secret.
  • PQC authentication (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-12): uses the RFC 7427 Digital Signature method, with ML-DSA-44/65/87 and all twelve SLH-DSA parameter sets. Only pure mode is used (no HashML-DSA). Peers must advertise the “Identity” hash in SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS, and IKEv2 fragmentation is mandatory because of the signature sizes. Hedged signing is preferred over deterministic. Whether PQ authentication is required is local policy; if it is optional, a downgrade is possible.

5. Algorithm overview

The table classifies the algorithms you will meet in IKEv2/IPsec by role. Security categories and sizes per algorithm are in part 1. Labels:

  • T: traditional, a quantum-vulnerable asymmetric algorithm (RFC 9794);
  • PQ: post-quantum, an asymmetric algorithm designed to resist quantum attacks;
  • QR: quantum-resistant, a symmetric or hash-based primitive that remains secure against known quantum attacks at the listed parameters;
  • ”–” means the algorithm does not play that role.
Algorithm (IANA ID)Key exchangePRF / key derivationIntegrityAuthenticationEncryption
MODP DH groups 14–18T––––
ECDH P-256 / P-384 / P-521 (19/20/21)T––––
brainpoolP256r1 / P384r1 / P512r1 (28/29/30)T––––
Curve25519 / Curve448 (31/32)T––––
ML-KEM-512 / -768 / -1024 (35/36/37)PQ1––––
FrodoKEMPQ2––––
HQCPQ3––––
PPK (RFC 8784, RFC 9867)–QR4–––
HMAC-SHA2-256 / -384 / -512 PRF (5/6/7)–QR5–––
HMAC-SHA2-256-128 / -384-192 / -512-256 (12/13/14)––QR5––
AES-CBC-128 / -256 (12)––––QR6
AES-GCM-128 / -256 (20)––QR6–QR6
ChaCha20-Poly1305 (28)––QR–QR
RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5, PSS)–––T–
ECDSA P-256 / P-384 / P-521–––T–
Ed25519 / Ed448–––T–
ML-DSA-44 / -65 / -87–––PQ7–
SLH-DSA (12 parameter sets)–––PQ7–
Composite ML-DSA (RFC 10073)–––T + PQ8–
FN-DSA–––PQ9–
PSK authentication (RFC 7296)–––QR10–

6. Key exchange and signature sizes in IKEv2

PQ keys and signatures are one to three orders of magnitude larger than their traditional counterparts (full size table in part 1). That size difference is the main engineering challenge in IKEv2, because IKE runs over UDP and IKE_SA_INIT cannot be fragmented (section 3.2).

Size of the initiator's key exchange data vs. packet size limits

Bytes, logarithmic scale. The rest of IKE_SA_INIT (headers, SA proposal, nonce, NAT detection) comes on top of this. Hover a bar for details.

Traditional (T) Post-quantum (PQ)
16 64 256 1,024 4,096 16,384 1280: IPv6 minimum MTU 1500: Ethernet MTU X25519 32 ECP P-256 64 ECP P-384 96 ECP P-521 132 MODP-3072 384 MODP-4096 512 ML-KEM-512 800 ML-KEM-768 1,184 ML-KEM-1024 1,568 FrodoKEM-640 9,616 FrodoKEM-976 15,632 FrodoKEM-1344 21,520
Show data as table
Key exchangeTypeInitiator KE data (bytes)
X25519T32
ECP P-256T64
ECP P-384T96
ECP P-521T132
MODP-3072T384
MODP-4096T512
ML-KEM-512PQ800
ML-KEM-768PQ1,184
ML-KEM-1024PQ1,568
FrodoKEM-640PQ9,616
FrodoKEM-976PQ15,632
FrodoKEM-1344PQ21,520
ItemSize (bytes)Carried inFits an unfragmented IKE_SA_INIT over UDP?What makes it work
X25519 / ECP P-384 / ECP P-52132 / 96 / 132IKE_SA_INITYes–
MODP-3072 / MODP-4096384 / 512IKE_SA_INITYes–
ML-KEM-512 (initiator / responder)800 / 768IKE_SA_INIT or IKE_INTERMEDIATEYes (the ML-KEM draft allows it)–
ML-KEM-7681,184 / 1,088IKE_INTERMEDIATENo, unless the path MTU is known to be largeRFC 9242 + RFC 9370 + RFC 7383, or TCP (RFC 9329)
ML-KEM-10241,568 / 1,568IKE_INTERMEDIATENoRFC 9242 + RFC 9370 + RFC 7383, or TCP
FrodoKEM-640 … -13449,616 … 21,520 / 9,720 … 21,632IKE_INTERMEDIATENo (several fragments)RFC 9242 + RFC 9370 + RFC 7383
ECDSA P-256 / Ed25519 signature≈ 64–72 / 64IKE_AUTHn/a (IKE_AUTH is encrypted)–
ECDSA P-384 / P-521 signature≈ 96–104 / ≈ 132–139IKE_AUTHn/a–
RSA-3072 / RSA-4096 signature384 / 512IKE_AUTHn/a–
ML-DSA-44 / -65 / -87 signature (public key)2,420 / 3,309 / 4,627 (1,312 / 1,952 / 2,592)IKE_AUTH (+ certificates)n/aRFC 7383 fragmentation (mandatory in the PQC-auth draft)
SLH-DSA-128s … -256f signature7,856 … 49,856IKE_AUTHn/aRFC 7383 fragmentation

Sizes are the raw key exchange data and signatures. The KE payload adds an 8-byte header, and IKE_SA_INIT also carries headers, the SA proposal, nonces and notifications. Each certificate in IKE_AUTH carries a public key and a CA signature, so a PQ certificate chain easily reaches 10 KB or more.


7. CNSA 2.0 and IPsec

The NSA algorithm suites, their timeline and the comparison with NIST SP 800-227 are in part 1. For IPsec specifically:

SuiteIPsec profileKey exchange in IKEv2
Suite B (2005)RFC 6379 / RFC 6380 (2011), Historic since RFC 8423 (2018)ECDH P-256 or P-384
CNSA 1.0 (2015/16)RFC 9206 (2022, Independent Submission)ECDH P-384, DH-3072 or DH-4096
CNSA 2.0 (2022)draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-profile-05 (Oct 2026, individual, would obsolete RFC 9206)CNSA 1.0 key exchange plus ML-KEM-1024 as additional key exchange

RFC 9206 defines three CNSA 1.0 IPsec suites: CNSA-GCM-256-ECDH-384, CNSA-GCM-256-DH-3072 and CNSA-GCM-256-DH-4096. They all use IKEv2, AES-256-GCM, and PRF_HMAC_SHA_512 (SHA-512 because of availability, although SHA-384 is the CNSA hash).

In its CNSA 2.0 FAQ, NSA notes that ML-KEM-1024 cannot simply replace the CNSA 1.0 key exchange in IKEv2 because of message size (section 6). It expects to use the IETF approach: a smaller initial key exchange followed by a larger, encrypted one. Concretely, CNSA 1.0 key establishment in IKE_SA_INIT is fortified by ML-KEM-1024 in an additional exchange (RFC 9370). NSA does not require hybrids. It rejects non-standard hybrids on NSS, but it does mention PPKs (RFC 8784) as possibly appropriate for specialised cases.

For VPN products, the CNSA 2.0 category table sets support and prefer by 2026, exclusive use by 2030, and from 1 January 2027 all new acquisitions for US national security systems must be CNSA 2.0-compliant (timeline in part 1).


8. Designing for several regimes

European, Australian and US authorities differ on hybrids, parameter sizes and deadlines (part 1, section 2.3). A VPN that must satisfy several regimes at once ends up with the union of their requirements:

  • PQ/T hybrid key exchange (for BSI and ANSSI);
  • category 5 parameters, ML-KEM-1024 (for ASD and CNSA 2.0);
  • a completion date of 2030 for the most demanding customers.

IKEv2 with RFC 9370 can satisfy all of them in one configuration, for example ECDH P-384 plus ML-KEM-1024. The flexibility to do that is the practical meaning of crypto agility.


9. A practical migration path

  1. Retire IKEv1 (RFC 9395). There is no PQC path for it (section 1.4).
  2. Determine which regimes apply (EU/NIS2 sector, BSI, ANSSI, NCSC, ASD, CNSA 2.0; see section 8 and part 1). They decide hybrid versus pure PQ, the parameter category, and your deadline.
  3. Inventory your gateways, clients, PKI and HSMs. Check firmware upgradability and vendor roadmaps for ML-KEM and ML-DSA.
  4. Enable the plumbing: IKEv2 fragmentation (RFC 7383), IKE_INTERMEDIATE (RFC 9242) and multiple key exchanges (RFC 9370). Consider TCP encapsulation (RFC 9329) where UDP fragmentation is a problem.
  5. Deploy PQ/T hybrid key exchange now: (EC)DH in IKE_SA_INIT plus ML-KEM-768, or ML-KEM-1024 for CNSA 2.0 and ASD, as ADDKE1. This addresses harvest-now-decrypt-later.
  6. Where you control both ends and can distribute keys, add a PPK (RFC 8784, or RFC 9867 to also protect the initial IKE SA).
  7. Strengthen the classical part: AES-256-GCM, PRF and integrity with SHA-384 or SHA-512, ECDH groups 20/21/29/30/32.
  8. Prepare PQ authentication: an ML-DSA (RFC 9881) or composite ML-DSA (RFC 10073) PKI, with attention to certificate chain sizes. Track draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth until it becomes an RFC.
  9. Close the downgrade door: once all peers support ML-KEM, refuse proposals without it.
  10. Build in agility: algorithms in configuration, not code. Expect FN-DSA, HQC and new IETF RFCs in the coming years.

10. Sources

IETF: RFCs

IETF: Internet-Drafts and working groups

IANA

NIST

NSA

Background (part 1)

Footnotes

  1. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-09 (RFC Editor queue). Code points assigned. ML-KEM-768 and -1024 should run in IKE_INTERMEDIATE or IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE (RFC 9370) unless the path MTU is known or a reliable transport is used. ↩

  2. Conservative unstructured-lattice KEM, not a NIST standard. Specified for IKEv2 in draft-ietf-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03 (WG document). No IANA code point yet. ↩

  3. Code-based KEM selected by NIST in March 2025 as a backup to ML-KEM. The FIPS (expected FIPS 207) is not yet final. IKEv2 usage is only an individual draft (draft-reddy-ipsecme-ikev2-hqc-00). ↩

  4. Not a key exchange but a symmetric secret mixed into key derivation. It is only as quantum-resistant as the PPK’s entropy and out-of-band distribution. RFC 8784 protects Child SAs only; RFC 9867 also protects the initial IKE SA. ↩

  5. HMAC with SHA-2 is not meaningfully weakened by known quantum algorithms. CNSA 2.0 requires SHA-384 or SHA-512. ↩ ↩2

  6. Grover’s algorithm offers at most a quadratic speed-up and parallelises poorly. NIST uses AES-128 key search as the benchmark for its lowest PQ security category. Policy profiles such as CNSA 2.0 nevertheless require AES-256. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-12 (RFC Editor queue). Uses RFC 7427 with OIDs from RFC 9881 / RFC 9909, pure mode only, requires the “Identity” hash and IKEv2 fragmentation. ↩ ↩2

  8. PQ/T hybrid: one composite key and one composite signature. Defined in RFC 10073 (Proposed Standard, Nov 2026). IKEv2 usage in draft-ietf-ipsecme-pq-hybrid-auth-01 (WG document). ↩

  9. Falcon-based. FIPS 206 is not yet final. IKEv2 usage only in an individual draft (draft-fu-ipsecme-ikev2-fn-dsa-pkr-00). ↩

  10. Symmetric, so not affected by Shor, but only secure with a high-entropy key. Low-entropy (password-like) PSKs are vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks even without a quantum computer. ↩

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